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Abstract 
For three years after the typical emerging economy opens its stock market to inflows of foreign 
capital, the average annual growth rate of the real wage in the manufacturing sector increases 
by a factor of three.  No such increase occurs in a control group of countries that do not 
liberalize.  The temporary increase in the growth rate of the real wage drives up the level of 
average annual compensation for each worker in the sample by $487 U.S.—an increase equal to 
nearly one-fifth of their annual pre-liberalization salary.  The increase in the growth rate of 
labor productivity in the wake of liberalization exceeds the increase in the growth rate of the real 
wage so that the increase in workers’ incomes does not drive up unit labor costs.  Overall, the 
results suggest that trade in capital may have a larger impact on wages than trade in goods.  
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I. Introduction 
The impact of trade on wages occupies a salient space in the collective imagination of the 
economics profession.  When a country opens up to trade with the rest of the world, income 
shifts away from that country’s scarce factor of production and toward the one which is abundant 
(Stolper and Samuelson, 1941).  Inspired by the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, 
economics journals abound with articles examining the extent to which trade induces factor price 
equalization.   
The evidence so far is mixed.  The consensus view suggests that trade with developing 
countries is, at best, a modest force behind the large decline in the relative wages of low-skilled 
workers in rich countries (Krugman, 1995; Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Cline, 1997; 
Lawrence, 2008).1  In the case of workers in developing countries, the evidence actually runs 
contrary to the theory.  Whereas Stolper-Samuelson predicts that trade with rich countries will 
increase the relative wages of low-skilled workers in poor countries, trade liberalization during 
the 1980s and 1990s actually increased wage inequality in the developing world (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007).  
Moving from trade in goods to trade in factors, an extensive literature also exists on the 
impact of labor flows on wage inequality.  Again, the results are mixed.  Some studies find that 
immigration from developing countries exacerbates wage inequality in the U.S. (Borjas, Freeman 
and Katz, 1997).  Others find little to no effect (Card, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2008). 
While many studies examine the impact of cross-border flows of goods and workers on 
relative wages, the literature pays far less attention to the impact of cross-border financial flows 
on the absolute level of wages. This is surprising for at least three reasons.   
First, trade in capital between nations has implications for real wages that are every bit as 
important as cross-border movements of goods and people.  In emerging economies where 
capital is scarce and labor abundant, opening up to free trade in capital should reduce the rental 
rate and increase the real wage. 
Second, examining the absolute level of wages provides information about the impact of 
opening up on the distribution of income between capital and labor that is just as important as the 
information that studies of wage inequality provide about the distribution of labor income 
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between high and low-skilled workers.  For instance, many emerging economies experienced 
unprecedented increases in national income as a result of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s.  
If all of the income gains from globalization accrued to capital, then the rise in wage inequality 
documented by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) necessarily implies that low-skilled workers 
experienced income losses.  On the other hand, if total labor income grew in line with (or faster 
than) the economy as a whole, then high-skilled workers may have experienced income gains 
that did not result in losses for low-skilled workers. 
Third, in the late 1980s emerging economies all over the world began easing restrictions 
on capital inflows of all kinds, giving economists a series of before-and-after scenarios with 
which to study the impact of factor flows on factor rewards.  A large body of research examines 
the impact of capital market liberalization on asset prices, investment and the growth rate of 
GDP per capita.2  But to the best of our knowledge, this literature is silent about the impact of 
capital account opening on the labor market. Consequently, two decades after the onset of capital 
market liberalization, we still have no systematic evidence about the impact of this sea change in 
policy on the average level of wages in the developing world.3  This paper provides the first 
systematic attempt to fill that gap.   
Figure 1 demonstrates that the level of the average annual manufacturing real wage in a 
sample of twenty-five emerging economies increased significantly after they liberalized 
restrictions on inflows of foreign capital between 1986 and 1996.4  Formal estimates show that 
the growth rate of the real wage in local currency terms jumped from 1.8 percent per year in the 
pre-liberalization period to an average of 5.7 percent in the year liberalization occurred and each 
of the subsequent three years.  The 3.9 percentage-point increase in the growth rate of the real 
wage during this window drives up the level of average annual compensation for each worker in 
the sample of liberalizing countries by the local currency equivalent of $487 U.S.—an increase 
equal to 18 percent of their annual pre-liberalization salary. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) explore the cost of capital but focus on its impact on relative wages.  Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996), Almeida 
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of capital. 
4
 In order to have comparable measures of levels of wages across countries, we plot the natural log of the real wage in PPP adjusted $U.S. terms. 
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One concern about Figure 1 is that an exogenous worldwide shock unrelated to capital 
market opening drove up real wages in liberalizing and non-liberalizing countries alike.  To 
distinguish the country-specific impact of liberalization policy from that of a common shock, our 
estimation procedure compares the difference in wage growth before and after liberalization for a 
group of countries that open up, to the same difference for a group of control countries.  Our 
regressions also include year-fixed effects to account for the possibility of common shocks that 
affect only the liberalizers, and country-fixed effects to allow for differences in underlying 
unobservable factors that may drive variation in wage growth across countries.  We also control 
for the impact of contemporaneous macroeconomic reforms such as inflation stabilization, trade 
liberalization, privatization and Brady Plan debt relief programs.  In every specification, we find 
an economically and statistically significant increase in real wage growth for countries in the 
liberalization group relative to the control group.   
An open economy interpretation of the neoclassical growth model provides the cleanest 
qualitative explanation of the new facts we uncover.  Opening up to capital inflows reduces the 
cost of capital in developing countries, and firms respond by increasing their rate of investment.  
For a given growth rate of the labor force and total factor productivity, a higher rate of 
investment increases the ratio of capital per effective worker, driving up the marginal product of 
labor and, in turn, the market-clearing wage.  Consistent with this chain of logic, Figure 2 
demonstrates that the growth rate of labor productivity also rises sharply following 
liberalizations.  After controlling for other factors, the average growth rate of labor productivity 
is 9.72 percentage points higher during the four-year liberalization window than it is in non-
liberalization years. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
From a quantitative perspective, however, it is less clear whether the neoclassical model 
captures all relevant features of the data.  In the standard growth model, capital account 
liberalization works strictly through its impact on capital accumulation and has no effect on the 
growth rate of aggregate total factor productivity (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006).  The increase 
in real wage growth present in the data is too large to be explained exclusively by capital 
deepening under conventional assumptions about capital shares and the elasticity of substitution.  
One possible explanation stems from the observation that liberalizations increase the quantity of 
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capital goods that emerging economies import from industrial nations (Alfaro and Hammel, 
2007).  If technology diffuses from developed to emerging economies through the technology 
embodied in capital goods imports à la Eaton and Kortum (1999, 2001a, b), then liberalizations 
may indeed drive up the growth rate of total factor productivity. 
While our approach enables us to test previously unexamined real-wage implications of 
capital market opening, difference-in-difference estimation requires caution because the standard 
errors are susceptible to serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).  Opening 
up to foreign capital increases investment, which in turn drives up productivity and wages.  
Because wages take time to adjust, wage growth for a given country may remain elevated above 
its steady-state rate for a number of years after opening, thereby inducing serial correlation in the 
country’s wage-growth residuals.  Similarly, many countries open up at approximately the same 
time, possibly inducing cross-country correlation in the residuals.  Our empirical analysis uses 
the Petersen (2009) technique to simultaneously adjust the standard errors for the potential 
presence of both types of correlation in the residuals.  No matter how we compute the standard 
errors, the impact of capital market opening on wages and productivity remains economically 
and statistically significant. 
The potential endogeneity of the liberalization decision also raises some concerns.  If 
profit-maximizing firms in a financially closed economy face the prospect of rapidly rising labor 
costs, they will want to substitute capital for labor.  To the extent that opening up the capital 
account would reduce the cost of capital, these firms have an incentive to lobby the government 
to do so.  If rising wages cause governments to open up, then our estimates will spuriously 
indicate a strong impact of liberalization on wages, when causation in fact runs the other way 
around.  While theoretically plausible, the endogeneity argument has no empirical support.  
Figure 1 is not consistent with the view that capital market opening occurs in response to rising 
labor costs.  If anything, wage growth actually falls slightly prior to the opening (Section 4C 
shows that mean reversion à la Ashenfelter [1978] does not drive our results).  The data are also 
not consistent with the explanation that governments liberalize in anticipation of higher future 
labor costs.  Although wages rise sharply following liberalization, labor productivity rises even 
faster, so unit labor costs do not increase. 
Finally, with only twenty-five countries in the sample, one may worry that a few large 
outliers drive the central finding.  This is not the case.  Sign tests show that the median growth 
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rate of real wages in the post-liberalization period exceeds the pre-liberalization median too often 
to be explained by chance. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II uses theory to generate testable 
predictions and explains how we identify real-life liberalization episodes.  Section III describes 
the data and construction of the control group, and presents preliminary findings.  Section IV 
discusses the empirical methodology, main results, and alternative interpretations.  Section V 
examines the consistency of the results with the theory.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Capital Market Integration in Emerging Economies 
This section uses an open economy version of the Solow model to generate previously 
untested predictions about the impact of capital flows on the time-path of the real wage ( w ).  
The central theoretical point about capital market integration is that it moves emerging 
economies from a steady state in which their ratios of capital to effective labor are lower (and 
rates of return to capital higher) than in the industrialized world, toward a steady state in which 
ratios of capital to effective labor, and rates of return, are equal in both regions. 
Because capital and labor are complements in production, the marginal product of labor 
(and hence the real wage) rises as countries open up and the process of capital deepening sets in.  
This fundamental insight about capital flows and the dynamic path of wages would also hold in 
an open economy Ramsey model.  Since the focus of the paper is on wages, not other variables 
(e.g., the current account) that depend on endogenous savings decisions, the Solow model 
provides the most concise exposition.  
IIA. Theory  
Assume that a country produces output using capital, labor, and a constant-returns-to-
scale production function with labor-augmenting technological progress:  
( , ).Y F K AL=              (1)  
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Let 
AL
Kk =  be the amount of capital per unit of effective labor and 
AL
Yy =  the amount 
of output per unit of effective labor.  Using this notation and the homogeneity of the production 
function we have:  
(2) y ( ).f k=           
                                                                               
Also assume that: the country saves a constant fraction of national income each period 
and adds it to the capital stock, capital depreciates at the rateδ , the labor force grows at the rate 
n, and total factor productivity grows at the rate g. 
When the economy is in steady state,  is constant at the level k .s statek , and the marginal 
product of capital equals the interest rate (r) plus the depreciation rate:  
. .s state( )f k r δ′ = +               (3)  
                                          
Because the impact of liberalization works through the cost of capital, Equation (3) has 
important implications for the dynamics of and w in the wake of opening up. k
Let r* denote the exogenously given world interest rate.  The standard assumption in the 
literature is that r* is less than r, because the rest of the world has more capital per unit of 
effective labor than the developing country.  It is also standard to assume that the developing 
country is small, so that nothing it does affects r*.  Under these assumptions, capital surges in to 
exploit the difference between r* and r when the developing country liberalizes. 
The absence of any frictions in the model means that the country’s ratio of capital to 
effective labor jumps immediately from .s statek  to its post-liberalization, steady-state level 
( *.s statek ).  In the post-liberalization steady state, the marginal product of capital equals the world 
interest rate plus the rate of depreciation:  
(4)  ( )* * .f k r.s state δ′ = +                     
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Instantaneous convergence implies that interest rates equalize immediately and that the 
country installs capital at the speed of light.  Two remarks about this unattractive feature of the 
model are in order.  
 First, instantaneous capital market convergence is not an artifact of the Solow model, but 
of the small open economy assumption under which liberalization gives the country access to an 
infinitely elastic supply of capital at the world interest rate.  The same counterfactual 
phenomenon would also occur in an open economy Ramsey model.  Second, although we do not 
see equalization of interest rates and capital-labor ratios across countries in the real world, a large 
literature documents that the cost of capital drops and investment booms when developing 
countries remove barriers to capital inflows.5  
There are a variety of formal methods for slowing down the speed of transition (e.g., 
adjustment costs of capital installation), but all of these methods would belabor the exposition 
without altering the model’s fundamental prediction.6  The vital point is that  is greater than 0 
during the country’s transition to its post-liberalization steady state.  The temporary growth in k 
has important implications for the time path of real wage growth, which we now derive. 
k
The growth rate of the real wage is the derivative of the natural log of w  with respect to 
time, that is, (ln ( ))w d w t
w dt
= .  Since workers are paid their marginal product of labor, 
.  This means that the growth rate of the real wage is given by: [ ( ) '( )]w A f k kf k= −
{ } ( )(ln( ( )) [ ( ) ( )] .
[ ( ) ( )]
w d d A kf k kw t A f k kf k
w dt dt A f k kf k
′′′= = − = − ′−

  We may write this expression as:  
(5)  k
k
kf
kkf
A
A
w
w
...
*
)(
)('*1σ+=    
  
where ( )[ ( ) ( )]
( ) ( )
f k f k kf k
f k f k k
σ ′ ′−= − ′′  is the elasticity of substitution. 
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The right-hand side of Equation (5) demonstrates that the growth rate of the real wage 
depends on the sum of two terms.  The first term, the growth rate of total factor productivity 
( A
A

), is not affected by capital account policy in the canonical version of the neoclassical growth 
model.  In Section V we discuss the implications of recent work that adopts a more catholic view 
of the relationship between capital account liberalization and total factor productivity.  For now, 
we proceed as though the impact of liberalization works strictly through the second term, which 
is the product of the inverse of the elasticity of substitution 1( ),σ  capital’s share in national 
income ( ( )
( )
f k k
f k
′
), and the growth rate of the ratio of capital per unit of effective labor ( k
k

). 
Prior to liberalization, the ratio of capital to effective labor is constant at the level .s statek , 
so that k
k

 equals 0, and  simply grows at the same rate as total factor productivity.  Since w k
k

 is 
greater than 0 during the transition to *.s statek , the growth rate of the real wage also increases 
temporarily.  Figure 3 illustrates the hypothetical time paths of r and the natural logs of k and w 
under the assumption that the interest rate converges immediately upon liberalization but the 
ratio of capital to effective labor does not. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Again, previous work documents that the actual responses of the cost of capital and the 
quantity of capital to liberalization resemble their hypothetical time paths.  Figure 1 demonstrates 
that the growth rate of the real wage also behaves in accordance with the theory.  In Section V 
we examine whether the size of the real wage increase is consistent with the magnitude of the 
previously documented increases in the growth rate of capital.  The next subsection explains how 
we identify the real-life liberalization episodes used to construct Figure 1. 
IIB. Reality 
An ideal test of the prediction that real wage growth will rise following the removal of 
restrictions on capital inflows requires information on capital account liberalization dates that is 
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more precise than one can generally obtain.  In theory, opening the capital account is as simple 
as pulling a single lever.  In reality, the capital account has many components, so trying to 
determine exactly when a country liberalizes (as in Subsection IIA) is not a trivial task.  In fact, 
the difficulty of determining precise liberalization dates causes most papers in the literature to 
ignore the problem (Eichengreen, 2001).  Instead of asking whether opening the capital account 
has an impact on a country’s growth rate (as theory clearly dictates), most published studies 
examine whether openness and long-run growth are positively correlated across countries.  The 
distinction matters greatly.  Testing for the effect of openness on growth can produce spurious 
results that tell us nothing about the true impact of liberalization (Henry, 2007).  
In contrast to the previous literature which makes no attempt to find periods of opening, 
this paper identifies liberalization dates using the point in time when countries first permitted 
foreigners to purchase shares of companies listed on the domestic stock market.  Relative to the 
most general conception of the capital account, at first blush the lifting of restrictions on foreign 
investment in the stock market may seem like a narrow way to define capital account 
liberalization.  But deeper reflection reveals that stock market liberalizations serve as observable 
de facto indicators of harder-to-pinpoint de jure policy changes.7 
For instance, the establishment by a foreign financial institution of an equity mutual fund 
is the modal means through which countries first liberalize their stock markets (see Table 1).  If 
country-fund opening dates are valid proxies for the occurrence of broader, undocumented 
liberalizations that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, then significant quantities of 
capital that are not associated with any particular fund may flow in to the country as a 
consequence of the opening.  Three facts suggest that our stock market liberalization dates 
provide non-specious indicators of a larger move toward open capital markets. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
First, a steady stream of country funds, issuances of American Depository Receipts, and 
other vehicles for foreign savers to buy domestic stocks typically follow the initial stock market 
liberalizations (Karolyi, 2004; Gozzi, Levine and Schmukler, 2010).  As a case in point, Chile 
liberalized its stock market in May 1987 through the Toronto Trust Mutual Fund, a Canadian 
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 See Kose et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion of de facto versus de jure indicators. 
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closed-end fund with a net asset value of $37.7 million U.S.8  In the next five years, six 
additional country funds with a cumulative net asset value of $991.8 million were established in 
Chile.9   
Moving beyond Chile, Figure 4 demonstrates the extraordinary change wrought by stock 
market liberalizations in emerging economies.  Net inflows of equity capital to the developing 
world, practically non-existent in the 1970s and early 1980s, accelerated sharply after the median 
stock market liberalization date in our sample (1989).  Policy makers often raise concerns about 
the potential volatility of portfolio capital, worrying that net inflows of equity can easily turn to 
net outflows at the first sign of trouble.  The facts do not substantiate this concern.  While Figure 
4 indicates that the pace of equity inflows to developing countries slowed following the Mexican 
Crisis in 1994–95 and the Asian Crisis of 1997–98, there is nothing that remotely resembles a 
reversal of equity inflows.10 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
It is also important to note that stock market liberalizations account for a substantial 
fraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), the most stable form of foreign capital.  A common 
misconception views FDI solely as green field investment, where a foreign company builds from 
scratch a new manufacturing plant in an emerging economy.  As a matter of official statistics, 
FDI includes any stock transaction (i.e., a cross-border merger or acquisition) that results in the 
purchaser owning 10 percent or more of the voting shares.11  In fact, from 1991–2000, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions accounted for 48 percent of FDI in Latin America and 61 
percent in East Asia (Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2004). 
Second, the facilitation of cross-border financial flows and ownership through stock 
market liberalization also induces large inflows of physical capital.  Stock market liberalizations 
in emerging economies coincide with a significant increase in their imports of capital goods.  In 
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 See Park and Van Agtmael (1993), Price (1994), and Wilson (1992). 
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Concerns about the volatility of debt flows, on the other hand, are quite well founded.  See Henry (2007) and Rogoff (1999). 
11 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as: “A category of cross-
border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the 
direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The ‘lasting interest’ is evidenced when the 
direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the direct investment enterprise” (OECD, 2008).   
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a sample of twenty-five countries that liberalized their stock markets between 1980 and 1997, 
liberalization led to a 9-percent increase in capital goods as a fraction of total imports, and the 
share of total machine imports to GDP rose by 13 percent (Alfaro and Hammel, 2007).  Because 
developing countries do not produce a significant portion of the capital goods that they use, the 
observation that imports of capital goods rise in concert with the advent of portfolio equity 
inflows increases confidence in earlier work on liberalization and aggregate investment. 
Third, with the sole exception of Malaysia during the Asian Crisis, none of the stock 
market liberalization dates from Table 1 were followed by a reversal of freedom of foreign 
access.   
Taken together, these three facts confirm that stock market liberalizations signify the 
beginning of a steady march toward greater freedom of capital inflows and provide the closest 
empirical analogue to the textbook example in Subsection IIA.  Accordingly, we use the stock 
market liberalization dates in Table 1 as the empirical counterpart to year [0] in the model of 
Subsection IIA (Figure 3).  Standard and Poor’s Emerging Markets Database covers 53 emerging 
economies with stock markets.  Of these 53 countries, 25 have stock market liberalization dates 
that are: (a) consistently used elsewhere in the literature and (b) verifiable from primary sources.  
Column (1) of Table 1 lists these twenty-five countries and the year in which they liberalized.12  
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the behavior of real wages in each of the twenty-five 
liberalizing countries.  The next section explains the source and construction of the wage data. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
III. Data 
The wage data come from the Industrial Statistics Database of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).  UNIDO provides data on total wages and 
salaries, total employment, and output for the manufacturing sector.  For a given year, wages and 
salaries include all payments to employees in cash or in kind.  Payments include: (a) direct 
wages and salaries; (b) remuneration for time not worked; (c) bonuses and gratuities; (d) housing 
allowances and family allowances paid directly by the employer; and (e) payments in kind.  
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 For further details about the complexities of determining liberalization dates see Section 5 of Henry (2007). 
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Excluded from wages and salaries are employers’ contributions on behalf of their employees to 
social security, pension, and insurance schemes, as well as the benefits received by employees 
under these schemes and severance and termination pay. 
Conceptually, total wages and salaries equal W*L*H, where W is the hourly wage rate, L 
is the stock of labor and H is total hours worked for the year.  Since UNIDO provides no data on 
the number of hours worked or the hourly wage, we divide total wages and salaries by total 
employment (L) to compute the average annual wage (W*H) of each worker in the 
manufacturing sector of each country (more on this point in Subsection IIIB.1).  UNIDO reports 
the value of wages and salaries in local currency terms.  We deflate each country’s nominal 
annual wage in local currency by the local consumer price index (CPI) to create a local currency-
denominated real wage. 
In addition to information on wages, employment, and output, we would like to have data 
on the manufacturing capital stock.  Unfortunately, UNIDO only provides data on investment.  
The standard approach to an absence of capital stock data converts investment flows to capital 
stocks with the perpetual inventory method by making assumptions about the initial level of 
capital in a given year and using the investment flows to interpolate the subsequent time path of 
the capital stock.  
Interpolation is methodologically sound when the focus is on long-run relationships 
where assumptions about the initial stock of capital make little difference.  In contrast, this paper 
focuses on short-run dynamics and therefore requires a clear picture of the trajectory of the 
capital stock during the liberalization window.  Simply put, it would be inappropriate to 
interpolate the growth rate of the capital stock during liberalization episodes when trying to 
measure the impact of liberalization on capital stock growth.  Moreover, the UNIDO data set is 
missing more than 50 percent of the country-year observations for investment in the aggregate 
manufacturing sector, and many of these missing observations fall within the liberalization 
window.  In the absence of reliable capital stock data, we will use (in Section V) estimates of 
capital stock growth from previously published work to check the consistency of our results with 
the theoretical channel from capital growth to wages. 
For each country in our sample, the annual wage data generally run from 1960 to 2003, 
with the exact dates differing by country. After taking the difference of the natural log to 
compute growth rates, we have a total of 758 country-year observations with which to identify 
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the impact of liberalization on real wage growth.  Table 1 shows that the timing of liberalizations 
is correlated across countries, so these 758 observations are not independent.  For instance, 
liberalizations may coincide with an exogenous global productivity shock that drives up wages in 
all countries, irrespective of whether or not they liberalize.   
To address whether it is the case that an exogenous shock unrelated to opening up drives 
the temporary increase in real wage growth, we select a group of control countries.  The control 
group consists of developing countries that are similar to the liberalizing countries except that the 
control countries did not open their stock markets to foreign investment.  Appendix A provides a 
list of countries that have stock markets but never liberalized. These nations comprise the control 
group against which we compare the real wage growth of the countries in our treatment group. 
IIIA. Descriptive Findings and Data Concerns  
Figure 1 exhibits a steep positive inflection after year [0], indicating a sharp increase in 
the growth rate of the real wage.  However, with only twenty-five countries in the sample, an 
important question is whether a few outliers drive the increase.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that this is not the case.  Only four 
countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand—have mean growth rates in the 
aftermath of liberalization that do not exceed their full sample mean (column 2).  Turning from 
means to medians, for each country in the sample we also performed simple Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests on the data for each country (Wilcoxon, 1945).  The procedure tests the equality of 
matched pairs of observations by using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.  Applied 
to the current context, the null hypothesis is that the distributions of pre- and post-liberalization 
wage growth are the same.  In the three-year post-liberalization period, five countries experience 
median real wage growth that falls below the median growth rate of their real wage in the pre-
liberalization period.  Given the null hypothesis, the probability (p-value) of finding no more 
than five countries with wage growth rates below their pre-liberalization median is 0.0015.   
Table 2 (Panel A) also shows the following quantities: (a) for each country, Column 1 
gives the change in the natural log of the wage over the liberalization window (years [0] to [3]); 
we denote this variable “liberalization log wage change” as a convenient shorthand expression; 
(b) Column 2 gives the liberalization log wage change for each country expressed relative to the 
country’s mean log wage change over the pre-liberalization window (years [-3] to [-1]); (c) 
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Column 3 gives the liberalization log wage change for each country expressed relative to the 
contemporaneous mean log wage change for the control group over the liberalization window 
(years [0] to [3]); (d) Column 4 gives the difference-in-difference that results from subtracting 
the real log wage change for the treatment countries expressed relative to the control group in the 
pre-liberalization window from the quantity in Column 3.   
The average cumulative log wage change for the treatment group during the liberalization 
window is 15.8% (Column 1); Relative to the pre-liberalization window, the cumulative log 
wage change is 19.1% (Column 2).  Relative to the control group during the liberalization 
window, the cumulative log wage change is 26% (Column 3).  The average difference-in-
difference of the cumulative log wage change is 20.2% (Column 4). 
For each of the quantities in Columns 1-4, we test whether the mean differs significantly 
from zero and report a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimate of the standard error in Table 2, 
Panel B.  These simple tests support the observation that liberalization leads to large effects on 
the level of real wages, lending credence to the more sophisticated regression results that follow. 
To provide additional descriptive evidence, Table 3 presents estimates of the impact of 
liberalization on the growth rate of real wages over time.  Panel A of Table 3 presents estimates 
of one coefficient only, but allowing progressively more periods after the reform (from year [2] 
up to [5]).  For example, the coefficient on the variable DUMMY03 estimates the average effect 
of liberalization on real wage growth in years [0], [1], [2], and [3].  The coefficient estimate of 
0.0369 suggests that the average real wage growth in that four-year span is 3.69% per year, or an 
overall increase of 14.76 percentage points (3.69*4).  The average estimated effect of 
liberalization on wage growth differs between specifications.  Consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that liberalization will produce a temporary increase in wage growth, the average 
effect becomes progressively smaller as we add more years subsequent to the liberalization 
window.  We also estimated the coefficient estimates on the liberalization dummy over the [0, 2], 
[2, 4], and [4, 6] event windows. However, the interpretation of the statistical difference of the 
coefficients across the different windows is difficult given their overlapping nature.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
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Panel A also presents an estimate of the “Ashenfelter” dip.  The variable “Dummy ([-3], 
[-1]),” which takes on a value of one for the three years before liberalization, shows that the pre-
reform dip in wage growth which is -2.37% compared to the post-reform average real wage 
growth of 3.69% in the four years following liberalization.  
Panel B presents the coefficient estimates on the liberalization dummy by individual year, 
ranging from the liberalization year [0] up to five years following the liberalization [5].  Columns 
2 and 3 indicate that the impact of liberalization on real wages is positive and significant in both 
the first [1] and second [2] years following the liberalization.  The coefficient estimates on the 
liberalization dummy are not significant in years [3] to [5]. The estimates in years [1] and [2] are 
significantly different from the coefficients in the other years.   
Although the numbers in Tables 2 and 3 suggest a reasonably consistent increase in real 
wage growth across countries, two other questions about the data remain.   
IIIA.1 Hours Worked. — First, the necessity of using annual data instead of hourly wages raises a 
potential measurement concern.  If the average number of annual hours worked per employee 
increases following liberalizations then total annual compensation may rise without any change 
in the implied hourly wage.  In other words, the rise in average annual labor income (W*H) 
documented in Figure 1 could be the result of an increase in hours worked rather than an increase 
in the hourly wage rate.  To interpret the impact of liberalization on total annual compensation as 
an increase in labor’s compensation per unit of time, we need to know that the average number 
of hours worked does not rise significantly following liberalizations.   
In an attempt to address this concern we ran into non-trivial constraints that forced us to 
rely on data for a subset of the countries in our sample.  UNIDO does not provide information on 
hours worked.  Data available from the International Labor Organization (ILO) is also not 
helpful because the ILO’s definition of hours worked is inconsistent across countries.  Within a 
given country, the ILO’s definition of hours worked sometimes varies across sectors and over 
time as well.  In the end, we used data provided by the Groningen Growth and Development 
Center (GGDC) because GGDC seemed to take most seriously the problems associated with 
trying to construct a consistent cross-country measure of hours worked.  In their own words, the 
GGDC’s estimates of hours worked are based on “…a country-by-country…judgment of which 
sources made the most appropriate adjustments to achieve the preferred concept of actual hours 
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worked per person employed” (GGDC, 2011).  The GGDC data include paid overtime and 
exclude paid hours that are not worked due to sickness, vacation, and holidays. 
Specifically, the data on hours worked come from GGDC’s Total Economy Database, 
which extends the work of Angus Maddison (1980). Although the Total Economy Database 
contains annual numbers on GDP, population, employment, hours, and productivity for about 
125 countries from 1950 to 2008, the series on hours worked per person are available for only 43 
countries.  Twelve of those 43 countries are also in our dataset: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Greece, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Taiwan, and Venezuela. 
To assess whether the rise in average annual compensation is driven by an increase in 
hours worked, Figure 5, which plots the natural log of hours worked in liberalization time, 
illustrates that hours worked are invariant to liberalization.  Between years [-5] and [-1] the 
average natural log of hours worked is 7.64.  In years [1] through [5] the average is 7.62.  In 
levels, these numbers translate to an average of 2,094 hours worked per year prior to 
liberalization and 2066 hours worked per year after.  Dividing 2,094 and 2,066 by the number of 
weeks in a year (52, not adjusting for vacation time) gives an estimate of roughly 40 hours to the 
average work week in these twelve countries before and after opening up.  That number seems 
entirely reasonable and reinforces our confidence in the GGDC data.  Looking at medians 
instead of means does not alter the story.  The median natural log of hours worked before 
liberalization is 7.59.  The median after liberalization is also 7.59.  In short, the number of hours 
worked per year does not change with liberalization and does not drive the increase in real wage 
growth documented in Figure 1.13  
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
IIIA.2  Concurrent Economic Events.— A second concern is that capital market openings may 
coincide with major economic events that could have a significant impact on wages, independent 
of any effects of liberalization.  Union activity provides a case in point. If agitation for higher 
pay by organized labor coincides with liberalization then the estimates may be overstated. A 
survey of labor market events during capital account liberalization episodes revealed that 
 
13
 As a final check we also used the GGDC data to construct a measure of hourly wages for the subset of twelve countries.  Regressing the 
change in the natural log of the hourly wage on the same right-hand-side variables that appear in Equation (6), we find results that are 
qualitatively identical to those reported in Panel A of Tables 4 through 6. 
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significant union activity to secure higher wages was present in only three of the twenty-five 
countries in our sample—Brazil, Turkey, and South Korea.  When these countries are dropped, 
the cumulative raw difference-in-difference estimate is not substantively changed at 17.39%.  
Also, when we control for unionization in the formal regression analysis, the coefficient on the 
capital account liberalization dummy remains unchanged.  In two other countries—Chile and 
South Africa—the government thwarted protestors demanding wage hikes.  The remaining 20 
countries in the sample did not experience any significant union activity during their 
liberalization episodes. 
While union activity does not drive the increase in wages, a separate concern is that 
liberalizations often coincide with major economic reforms that could have a significant impact 
on wages apart from any effects of liberalization. Stabilizing inflation, removing trade 
restrictions, and privatizing state-owned enterprises are all reforms that may affect real wages 
through their impact on the efficiency of domestic production.  Indeed, Table 1 demonstrates that 
the timing of these reforms makes it plausible that they, not capital account liberalization, are 
responsible for the increase in real wages apparent in Figure 1.  The next section, which presents 
our formal empirical methodology and results, uses the information in Table 1 to control directly 
for the impact of other reforms and to address a host of lingering concerns and alternative 
explanations.  
IV. Empirical Methodology and Results 
We evaluate the statistical significance of the temporary increase in wage growth by 
estimating the following difference-in-difference panel regression specification:  
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The left-hand-side variable, , is the change in the natural log of the real local 
currency value of annual compensation for country i  in year t minus the average change in the 
natural log of the real wage for the group of control countries in year t.  Moving to the right-hand 
side of Equation (6), the variable  is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 in 
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the year that country i liberalizes ([0]) and each of the subsequent three years ([1], [2] and [3]).  
This means that the coefficient  measures the average annual deviation of the growth rate of 
the real wage in the treatment group from the growth rate of the real wage in the control group 
during the three-year liberalization episode. 
1a
The right-hand side of Equation (6) also contains four additional country-specific dummy 
variables—STABILIZE, TRADE, PRIVATIZE, and BRADY—that are designed to prevent 
country-specific shocks in the shape of economic reforms from artificially inflating the 
coefficient on LIBERALIZE.  We treat reforms and liberalization symmetrically, constructing 
dummy variables that take on the value 1 in the year a reform program begins and each of the 
three subsequent years. 
Turning at last to the error term, itε , it is important to note that when the residuals are 
correlated across observations, OLS standard errors can be biased and may over- or 
underestimate the true variability of the coefficient estimates.  Specifically, the standard 
distributional assumptions needed for valid statistical inference will not hold in the presence of: 
(a) correlation of the residuals across countries within a given time period (cross-sectional 
dependence), or (b) correlation of the residuals within a given country over time (time-series 
dependence).  Point (a) matters because liberalizations often occur at the same time for different 
countries, possibly inducing correlation in the wage-growth residuals across countries at a given 
point in time.  Point (b) matters because it takes time for wages to adjust to their new trajectory; 
for a given country, wage growth may remain elevated above its steady-state rate for a number of 
years in the post-liberalization period, thereby inducing serial correlation in the country’s wage-
growth residuals.  To compute accurate standard errors we employ various clustering procedures 
described below. 
 
IVA. Benchmark Estimates: A Difference-in-Difference Specification  
Table 4 (Column 1) presents the results from our estimate of Equation (6), restricting the 
sample to data three years before the liberalization and three years after.  We cluster the standard 
errors by year to account for potential cross-country correlation in the wage growth residuals. 
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that after accounting for the effects of inflation stabilization, trade 
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liberalization, the Brady Plan, and privatization, the coefficient on LIBERALIZE is 0.031.  This 
implies that relative to the control group, the average growth rate of the typical country’s real 
wage exceeds its long-run mean by 3.1 percentage points per year during liberalization episodes.   
[ Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
The impact of other economic reforms on the growth rate of the real wage is not as robust 
as that of liberalization, but we do find some significant effects of inflation stabilization and 
privatization when the regression specification includes these variables individually.14 The 
coefficient estimates demonstrate that controlling for the other economic reforms that tend to 
accompany liberalization does not reduce the impact of capital account opening on the growth 
rate of the real wage. This reinforces our confidence in the accuracy of the reform dates and the 
relevance of the corresponding dummy variables as controls.   
Column 2 of Table 4 estimates Equation (6) using data that spans the entire sample to 
show that the impact of liberalization on real wage growth is robust to potential concerns about 
the length of the pre-liberalization window used for estimation. The coefficient on LIBERALIZE 
is 0.036 and is significant at the 1 percent level.  
Turning from economic reforms to statistical issues, researchers do not always know 
whether the precise form of the dependence in residuals is time-series or cross-sectional in 
nature. As a way of addressing this concern, Petersen (2009) suggests a less parametric 
estimation approach that clusters on two dimensions simultaneously (e.g., country and time).  
Petersen’s approach uses the following estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, which 
combines the standard errors clustered by country with the standard errors clustered by time: 
.&Country Time Country Time WhiteV V V= + −V
 
15 
The first matrix on the right-hand side allows standard errors to be clustered by country, 
capturing the unspecified correlation between observations on the same country in different years 
(e.g., correlations between εit and εis).  The second matrix on the right-hand side, allows standard 
14
 The estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy ranges 0.031 to 0.043 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in nearly 
every specification that includes the economic reform dummies one by one. These additional results are available in an online appendix on the 
journal’s website. 
15
 Proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006), and Thompson (2006).  
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errors to be clustered by time, capturing the unspecified correlation between observations on 
different countries in the same year (e.g., correlations between εit and εkt).  Since both the 
country- and time-clustered variance-covariance matrices include the diagonal of the variance-
covariance matrix, the Petersen procedure subtracts off the White variance-covariance matrix to 
avoid double counting.  This method allows for both a country and a time effect, although 
observations on different countries in different years are assumed to be uncorrelated.  Petersen 
(2009) demonstrates through simulation that clustering by two dimensions produces less biased 
standard errors. 
Table 4 (Columns 3 and 4) presents estimates of Equation (6) that use Petersen’s (2009) 
procedure to simultaneously cluster the standard errors by year (to adjust for cross-country 
correlation) and by country (to adjust for serial correlation).16  Since it is not possible to include 
country-fixed effects while simultaneously clustering the standard errors by year and country, the 
magnitudes of the estimates in Columns 3 and 4 are not identical to those in Columns 1 and 2, 
but they are very similar.  Focusing, then, on the precision of the estimates, we see that the 
coefficient estimate on LIBERALIZE (in Columns 3 and 4) is significant at the 5 and 1 percent 
confidence levels, respectively.  This suggests that our general finding is robust to concerns 
about both serial and cross-country correlation in the error terms. 
IVA.1 An Alternative Specification: Country and Year Fixed Effects.— As an alternative to our 
difference-in-difference estimates, we regress the change in the natural log of the real wage or a 
full set of country-fixed and year-fixed effects plus the reform dummies.  Specifically, we 
estimate:  
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The left-hand-side variable, , is the natural log of the real local currency value of 
annual compensation for country i  in the treatment group in year t minus the same variable in 
year t-1. The variable  is shorthand for the set of year-fixed effects.  The right-hand side of 
ln itwΔ
tYEAR
16
 For another discussion of multi-way clustering see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2009). 
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Equation (7) also contains four additional dummy variables—STABILIZE, TRADE, PRIVATIZE, 
and BRADY.  The standard errors are clustered by year. 
Table 4 (Column 5) presents the results from our estimate of Equation (7).  The standard 
errors are clustered by year to account for potential cross-country correlation in the wage growth 
residuals.  The impact of liberalization on real wage growth is economically large. Controlling 
for the effects of inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, the Brady Plan, and privatization, the 
coefficient on LIBERALIZE is 0.0388 and significant at the 5 percent level.17  This means that 
during liberalization episodes, the average growth rate of the typical country’s real wage exceeds 
its long-run mean by 3.88 percentage points per year.  Accounting for the other economic 
reforms that tend to accompany liberalization also does not affect the impact of capital account 
opening on the growth rate of the real wage.   
IVB. Alternative Explanations 
One interpretation of the evidence says that wages rise following liberalizations because 
of an increase in labor demand stemming from a capital-deepening induced rise in productivity.  
Alternatively, the increase in wages may be due to a reduction in labor supply.  The argument 
runs as follows.  If workers perceive the impact of liberalization on wages to be permanent, then 
they effectively receive a positive shock to their permanent income and may reduce their labor 
supply accordingly.  If this is the case then the observed increase in wage growth may stem from 
a decrease in labor supply as well as an increase in labor demand.18 
The employment data are not consistent with a decrease in labor supply.  There is no 
discernible change in the growth rate of employment following liberalizations.  The regression 
specifications in Table 5 examine the change in the natural log of employment on the same right-
hand-side variables that appear in Equation (7). The liberalization dummy is never significant.  
Also, if labor supply decreases then we would also expect a decline in the number of hours 
worked.  Again, Figure 4 demonstrates that this is not the case.  Overall, the evidence does not 
suggest that workers reduce their labor supply in response to liberalization.  While we do not 
 
17
 The estimate of the coefficient on LIBERALIZE ranges from 0.038 to 0.043 in additional regressions that include the reform dummies 
individually. The coefficients on the liberalization dummy are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  These results are available in an 
online appendix on the journal’s website. 
18
 An alternative view is that labor supply is relatively inelastic (see Pencavel 1986 on this point).  If this is the case, workers may not reduce 
the number of hours that they want to work in response to the increase in their expected future income. 
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formally estimate the labor supply decision and cannot exclude the possibility that part of the 
wage increase results from a decrease in labor supply, if this alternative explanation is at work its 
overall impact appears to be second order. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
IVC. Economic Interpretation 
There are two ways to examine the economic significance of the results.  First, consider 
the magnitude of the growth rate of the real wage during liberalization episodes relative to the 
growth rate of the real wage over the entire sample.  To do this, use the estimate of the constant 
and the liberalization dummy from the regression that controls for other economic reforms 
(Column 5 in Table 4).  Real wages grow by an average of 1.8 percent per year over the entire 
pre-liberalization sample.  The estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy is 0.039.  
Adding the average pre-liberalization real wage growth to the coefficient on the liberalization 
dummy gives the average growth rate of the real wage during liberalization episodes—5.7 
percent per year.  This means that in the year the liberalization occurs and each of the subsequent 
three, the average growth rate of the real wage is almost three times as large as in non-
liberalization years (5.7 versus 1.8).   
Of course, the increase in the growth rate of the real wage is temporary, so a second way 
of assessing economic significance is to compute the impact of liberalization on the permanent 
level of the real wage.  For the countries in the treatment group, the average level of annual 
compensation in the year before liberalization (year [-1]) is 2,686 PPP-adjusted dollars.  During 
the three-year liberalization window the real wage grows at 5.7 percent per year, so that by the 
end of year [3] the average level of the real wage is 2,686e0.057*4= 3,374 PPP-adjusted dollars.  
Now assume that in the absence of liberalization the real wage would have grown at the sample 
mean of 1.8 percent per year.  In that case, the level of the real wage at the end of year [3] would 
be 2,686 e0.018*4= 2,887 PPP-adjusted dollars.  In other words, by the time the impact of 
liberalization has run its course, the average worker in the manufacturing sector has annual take-
home pay that is 487 dollars higher (3,374 minus 2,887) than it would have been in the absence 
of liberalization.  This change in the level of the wage is equal to nearly one-fifth of the average 
manufacturing worker’s pre-liberalization, PPP-adjusted take-home pay. 
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It is also important to note that the results are not an artifact of mean reversion following 
a temporary fall in earnings à la Ashenfelter (1978).  Figure 1 shows a decline in the level of the 
real wage from an average of 2,968 PPP-adjusted dollars five years prior to liberalization to an 
average of 2,686 PPP-adjusted dollars one year prior to liberalization.  A few hypothetical 
calculations demonstrate that the results do not simply reflect a bounce-back effect.  Suppose 
that instead of declining, on average, for the next four years (as they do in the data), real wages 
grew at their (continuously compounded) long-run rate of 1.8 percent per year over the pre-
liberalization window.  Under that scenario, the real wage in year [3] would have been 3,485 
PPP-adjusted dollars.  The actual level of the average real wage in year [3] is 4,050 PPP-adjusted 
dollars, roughly 20 percent higher than the level that would have prevailed had wages simply 
continued to grow at their long-run rate.   
IVD. The Impact of Liberalization on Productivity 
The results suggest that the response of wages to capital account liberalization is large.  
To scrutinize the plausibility of our estimates we cross-checked the results against data on labor 
productivity.  The model in Section 2 demonstrates that liberalization induces capital deepening, 
and through the increase in capital per worker, drives up productivity, the demand for labor, and 
the real wage.  If this chain of reasoning has any empirical bite, then, during liberalization 
episodes, labor productivity should rise in concert with wages.   
To formally test the relation between liberalization and the growth rate of labor 
productivity, we estimate the following difference-in-difference regression:  
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Equation (8) is identical to (6) except that instead of the change in the natural log of the 
annual wage, the left-hand-side variable is now the change in the natural log of the annual real 
value-added per worker in local currency terms minus the average change in the natural log of 
real value-added per worker in the control group.  Again, to be consistent with the wage 
estimates, we cluster the standard errors by year. 
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Table 4 (Column 6) shows that liberalization has a positive and significant impact on 
productivity growth. Accounting for the potential impact of other economic reforms, the estimate 
of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy is 0.0972 when the sample is restricted to the three 
years prior to and three years following the liberalization year.19 This means that the average 
growth rate of productivity is 9.72 percentage points higher during the three-year liberalization 
window than in non-liberalization years. The 9.72 percentage point increase in productivity 
growth associated with liberalization is larger than the 3.9 percentage point increase in wage 
growth. Because the increase in productivity outstrips the increase in wage growth, 
manufacturing-sector profitability actually rises during liberalizations.20 Column 7 of Table 4 
shows that the results for productivity growth and liberalization are robust to all of the statistical 
concerns raised about the estimation of wage growth and liberalization examined in Subsection 
IVA. 
V. Discussion 
While the size of the increase in productivity growth more than matches the size of the 
increase in real wage growth, the important unanswered question is whether the magnitude of 
either increase is consistent with the model that drives the estimates.  To answer the question, 
begin with the standard assumption that liberalization has no impact on total factor prodcutivity 
growth and recall Equation (5): 
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total factor productivity, Equation (5) implies that the change in the growth rate of the real wage 
equals the product of three numbers: the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution, capital’s 
share in national income, and the change in the growth rate of capital per effective worker. 
Specifically, we have: 
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 In the online appendix, every estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy is statistically significant in regression specifications that 
include the reform dummies individually. These results suggest that liberalization, not an external shock or domestic economic reforms, is 
responsible for the increase in productivity growth. 
20
 Chari and Henry (2008) also find that the return to capital in the manufacturing sector rises during liberalizations. 
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The capital share typically lies between 1/3 and 1/2.21  Obtaining an estimate of the 
change in capital growth requires a little more effort.  We know from previous work that 
aggregate capital stock growth increases by 1.1 percentage points following liberalizations 
(Henry, 2003).  We can use the aggregate number to calculate a rough upper bound for the 
change in manufacturing sector capital growth.  For the countries in our sample, the 
manufacturing sector accounts for about 1/5 of GDP.  Assuming zero net growth in capital for 
the agriculture and service sectors, the largest possible increase in the growth rate of capital in 
manufacturing is about 5.5 percentage points.  This back-of-the-envelope calculation finds 
empirical support elsewhere in the literature.  Using a subset of the countries in this paper, Chari 
and Henry (2008) calculate that the growth rate of capital in the manufacturing sector increases 
by 4.1 percentage points per year following liberalizations.  Increases in capital stock growth 
between 4.1 and 5.5 percentage points are also consistent with the size of the fall in the cost of 
capital that occurs following liberalizations.22 
Suppose the capital share is 1/2 and the change in capital growth is 5.5 percentage points. 
Then for capital-deepening alone to explain the 3.9 percentage-point increase in wage growth 
you need an elasticity of substitution less than or equal to 0.7.  If the capital share is 1/3 and the 
change in capital growth is 4.1 percentage points, then the elasticity of substitution must be less 
than or equal to 0.35.  There is little consensus on the size of the elasticity of substitution.  Early 
work estimated small elasticities that were statistically indistinguishable from zero.23  More 
recent studies cannot reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution is 1 (Caballero, 
1994).  Most relevant to the countries in this paper, Coulibaly and Millar (2007) estimate an 
elasticity of substitution of about 0.8 for South Africa.  With a standard error of 0.08, the 
Coulibaly and Millar estimate could imply an elasticity as small as 0.64.  With a change in 
capital growth of 5.5 percentage points, a capital share of 1/2, and an elasticity of substitution of 
0.64, Equation (9) predicts that liberalization would generate a 4.3 percentage-point increase in 
wage growth. 
 
21
 A few studies find capital shares in developing countries as high as two-thirds (See for example, Rodríguez and Ortega, 2006). On the other 
hand, Gollin (2002) documents capital shares closer to a third.  
22
 See Henry (2007), pp. 897-900. 
23
 For a survey of this literature see Chirinko (1993). 
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We do not mean to push any particular value for the capital share.  And it is not clear that 
we have a consensus estimate of the size of the elasticity of substitution in developed countries, 
let alone emerging economies.  What is clear, however, is that if you want to maintain the 
assumption that liberalization has no impact on total factor productivity, then the observed 
increases in wage growth are consistent with the model only if you are willing to concede that 
the elasticity of substitution is substantially less than 1 (i.e., the world is not Cobb-Douglas). But 
if the elasticity of substitution is significantly less than one, then it is hard to understand how 
capital’s income share remains constant (or increases) following the liberalization-induced fall in 
the cost of capital. 
On the other hand, if you maintain that the world is Cobb-Douglas, then our wage results 
imply that liberalization has an impact on total factor productivity. In a Cobb-Douglas world 
with a capital share of one half, Equation (9) implies an increase in real wage growth of 2.75 
percentage points—leaving a gap of roughly 1 percentage point to be explained. A gap of 1 
percentage point per year would require a 4 percent increase in the level of factor productivity 
over four years. If opening up brings about changes that raise an economy’s permanent level of 
efficiency by four percent, then this will show up as a temporary increase in total factor 
productivity growth during the transition.24 One can imagine a number of channels that lie 
outside the confines of the Solow model through which liberalization raises efficiency by this 
magnitude over the course of a four year window.  
For instance, liberalization may enable firms to import more efficient machines (e.g., 
tractors instead of hoes) that effectively shift the country’s production technology closer to the 
world frontier.  DeLong (2004) argues that after liberalizing the capital account “…developing 
countries…would enjoy the benefits from technology advances and from learning-by-doing 
using modern machinery.”  In other words, to the extent that technological progress diffuses 
from developed to developing countries, the importation of new machinery provides an 
important conduit through which the diffusion may occur (Eaton and Kortum, 2001a).  Almost 
all of the world’s research and development (R&D) takes place in a small number of industrial 
countries (Eaton and Kortum, 1999), and the same group of countries accounts for over 70 
 
24
 While endogenous growth models such as Romer (1986) certainly allow for the possibility of permanent growth effects due to innovation, this 
view of the world strikes us as most relevant for countries that actually do the innovating. Emerging economies are more likely to be adopters of 
technology, engaged in a periodic process of capital upgrading and technological catch up that bears closer resemblance to periodic jumps in the 
level of total factor productivity. 
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percent of the world’s machine exports in a given year (Eaton and Kortum, 2001b; Alfaro and 
Hammel, 2007).  
Evidence from the literature supports the conjecture that developing countries can import 
technological progress by liberalizing the capital account.  In the immediate wake of 
liberalizations, firms in the manufacturing sector of developing countries accumulate capital at a 
faster rate than they did before the liberalization (Chari and Henry, 2008).  Furthermore, these 
countries raise their rate of capital accumulation by importing more capital goods.  As a result of 
liberalization, the share of capital goods imports to total imports rises by 9 percent, and the share 
of total machine imports as a fraction of GDP rises by 13 percent (Alfaro and Hammel, 2007).   
The observation that both imports of capital goods and total factor productivity rise in 
concert with liberalization lends credence to the notion that new capital goods embody 
technological progress and that developing countries can raise their growth rates of total factor 
productivity by liberalizing the capital account.25  The observation is also consistent with work 
showing that cross-country variation in the composition of capital investment explains much of 
the cross-country variation in total factor productivity (Caselli and Wilson, 2003). 
On the other hand, some argue that the simplest explanation of capital-account-
liberalization-induced total factor productivity growth lies with the economic reforms that 
accompany liberalization.  Economic reforms improve resource allocation, essentially producing 
a one-time shift in the production function that temporarily raises the growth rate of total factor 
productivity, without inducing technological progress per se (Henry, 2003).  Others posit that 
liberalization facilitates increased risk sharing, which might encourage investment in riskier, 
higher-growth technologies (Levine, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998a). Yet another explanation 
is that capital account liberalization generates unspecified “collateral benefits” that increase 
productivity (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2006).  
Sorting through competing explanations for the increase in total factor productivity 
following liberalizations is an important research challenge that lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.  The bottom line of the discussion here is that the size of the increases in wage growth and 
productivity we report are consistent with the model that drives our estimation.  Whether the 
primary source of those increases lies with capital deepening or increased total factor 
 
25
Also, in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), liberalization may improve domestic firms’ access to external finance, which might in turn 
increase the rate at which firms import capital goods. 
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productivity depends on reasonable differences in views about the elasticity of substitution that 
have yet to be resolved in the literature. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In the process of debating the impact of trade on wages, international economists pay 
relatively little attention to the impact of trade in capital.  Debating the costs and benefits of 
capital market liberalization on economic growth, macro and financial economists largely ignore 
the implications of increased capital market integration for wages.  Yet labor income typically 
accounts for about two-thirds of GDP.  Almost two decades after the advent of capital account 
liberalization in the developing world, our paper provides the first systematic analysis of the 
impact of liberalization on the level of real wages.   
Increased capital market integration in the 1980s and 1990s sharply reduced the cost of 
capital for manufacturing firms in emerging economies.  In response to the fall in their cost of 
capital, these firms installed new machinery, much of which was imported from abroad, and may 
have embodied substantial technological progress.  The combination of capital deepening and 
technological progress drove up the productivity of workers in the manufacturing sector.  
Accordingly, the demand for those workers increased, along with their real wage.26   
While the focus of this paper is on the level of real wages, our findings also provide 
important clues about the rise in wage inequality in developing countries documented by 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).  If the liberalization-induced increase in wages was evenly 
distributed across skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector, then no increase in 
the skill premium would have occurred.  However, two observations suggest that the increase in 
manufacturing sector wages was probably concentrated among highly skilled workers.  First, 
countries’ imports of machinery and equipment rise substantially in the aftermath of capital 
account liberalizations and firms that import machinery and equipment generally employ a larger 
share of high-skilled workers than firms that do not import such capital (Harrison and Hanson, 
1999).  Second, work that is characterized as unskilled from a developed country’s perspective 
 
26 Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) and Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely (2000) make a similar argument for Latin 
America.   
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may be skilled-labor intensive when compared with typical domestic production activities in a 
developing country (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997, 2003).   
While it seems plausible to consider that capital market liberalization contributed to 
increased wage inequality in developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s, it is no more than 
a conjecture because the economic model we employ makes no distinction between skilled and 
unskilled workers.  Moving from conjecture to testable prediction would require a model with 
skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital as three distinct factors of production.  In a three-factor 
model, capital deepening could exacerbate wage inequality through a form of skill-biased 
technological change if capital is more substitutable for unskilled workers and more 
complementary to skilled workers.  However, since we do not use such a model, and our data do 
not provide information about the skill composition of the labor force, we cannot test this 
prediction. 
Be that as it may, the bottom line of this paper is that increased capital market integration 
has raised the average standard of living for a significant fraction of the workforce in developing 
countries.  If labor is mobile across sectors, then over time we would expect the productivity-
driven wage gains in manufacturing to translate into higher incomes for workers elsewhere in the 
economy.  The extent to which the labor market in these countries functions well enough to 
allow workers to respond to wage differentials across sectors is an important issue that lies 
beyond the scope of this paper.27  As the quality and breadth of data on labor markets in 
developing countries continues to improve, future work may produce more definitive 
conclusions. 
 
27
 See Wacziarg and Seddon Wallack (2004) for an analysis of intersectoral mobility of labor in response to trade reforms. 
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FIGURE 1. REAL WAGE GROWTH RISES IN THE WAKE OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
LIBERALIZATIONS.
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FIGURE 2. PRODUCTIVITY RISES IN THE WAKE OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATIONS.  
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FIGURE 3.  HYPOTHETICAL IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION ON THE COST OF CAPITAL, INVESTMENT 
AND THE REAL WAGE. 
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FIGURE 5. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF HOURS WORKED DOES NOT RISE WITH LIBERALIZATION. 
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TABLE 1.  CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATIONS OCCUR AROUND THE SAME TIME AS OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIC REFORMS. 
Country Capital Account 
Liberalization
Stabilization Trade Liberalization Privatization Brady Plan Debt 
Relief
Argentina Nov-89 Nov-89 Apr-91 Feb-88 Apr-92
Brazil Mar-88 Jan-89 Apr-90 Jul-90 Aug-92 
Chile May-87 Aug-85 1976 1988 NA 
Colombia Dec-91 NA 1986 1991 NA 
Egypt Feb-91 Apr-91 Apr-91 Apr-91 NA 
Greece Jul-94 Jul-89 Apr-53 Nov-90 NA 
India Jun-86 Nov-81 1994 1991 NA 
Indonesia Sep-89 May-73 1970 1991 NA 
Israel Oct-89 Jul-85 Feb-52 Jan-86 NA 
Jordan  Dec-95 May-94 1965 Jan-95 Jun-93 
Malaysia May-87 NA 1963 1988 NA 
Mexico May-89 May-89 Jul-86 Nov-88 Sep-89 
Morocco Dec-92 Jan-84 Sep-83 1993 NA 
Nigeria  Aug-95 Jan-91 NA Jul-88 Mar-91 
Pakistan Feb-91 Sep-93 2001 1990 NA 
Philippines May-86 Oct-86 Nov-88 Jun-88 Aug-89 
Portugal Jan-93 Oct-90 Jan-60 Apr-89 NA 
South Africa Mar-95 Mar-86 Apr-94 Apr-94 NA 
South Korea Jun-87 Jul-85 1968 NA NA 
Spain Jan-93 Jan-78 Jul-59 1985 NA 
Taiwan  May-86 NA 1963 NA NA 
Thailand Sep-87 Jun-85 Always Open 1988 NA 
Turkey  Aug-89 Jul-94 1989 1988 NA 
Venezuela Jan-90 Jun-89 May 1989** Apr-91 Jun-90 
Zimbabwe Jun-93 Sep-92 NA 1994 NA 
Notes: The capital account liberalization dates identified in this table are the dates on which the eighteen countries in Column 1 eased restrictions prohibiting foreign 
ownership of domestic stocks.    The liberalization dates in Column 2 are an amalgamation of those in Henry (2000), Levine and Zervos (1998b) and Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000).  Columns 2 through 6 list the dates of major economic reforms that occurred around the same time as the capital account liberalizations.  The 
stabilization program dates in Column 3 come from Henry (2002) and various issues of the IMF Annual Reports.  Column 4 lists trade liberalization dates from 
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Sachs and Warner (1995).  The privatization dates in Column 5 come from the Privatization Data Base maintained by the World Bank.  Finally, Column 6 lists the 
month and year that each country received debt relief under the Brady Plan.  The debt relief dates come from Cline (1995), Lexis Nexis, and various issues of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit.  **Venezuela reversed its trade liberalization reforms in 1993.  
TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR REAL WAGE GROWTH DURING CAPITAL 
ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION EPISODES 
Panel A 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country 
Liberalization 
Real Wage 
Change 
Liberalization 
Wage Change 
Relative to 
Pre-
liberalization 
Wages 
Liberalization 
Wage Change 
Relative to 
Control 
Group 
Difference-
in-Difference 
Wage 
Change 
Argentina -2.88% 3.10% 18.70% 16.26% 
Brazil 25.15% 23.78% 38.17% 19.12% 
Chile 20.18% 6.36% 30.98% 1.50% 
Colombia 9.75% 9.25% 22.76% 4.37% 
Greece 9.33% 13.11% 30.19% 33.61% 
India 13.18% 9.79% 23.97% 2.32% 
Indonesia -4.54% -14.53% 12.25% -2.16% 
Israel 16.38% 14.64% 19.93% 5.51% 
Jordan 14.12% 23.63% 13.39% 13.93% 
Malaysia 2.57% -3.71% 27.02% 22.98% 
Mexico 23.00% 39.07% 39.80% 44.93% 
Morocco 23.68% 19.77% 32.72% 22.49% 
Nigeria -51.99% 25.87% -51.68% 0.13% 
Pakistan 3.01% -10.01% 5.54% -22.24% 
Philippines 14.15% 6.25% 27.17% 3.22% 
Portugal 45.40% 59.56% 60.26% 66.57% 
South Africa 6.77% 3.06% 17.56% -4.33% 
South Korea 49.05% 27.45% 69.91% 54.30% 
Spain 6.35% 8.30% 11.01% 3.88% 
Taiwan 42.79% 17.19% 57.64% 34.13% 
Thailand 17.16% -8.00% 35.18% 12.61% 
Turkey 59.46% 65.14% 76.26% 73.59% 
Venezuela -13.13% 35.15% -2.35% 17.75% 
Zimbabwe 51.08% 99.55% 60.29% 87.78% 
Mean 15.83% 19.74% 28.19% 21.35% 
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Panel B 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Right Hand Side 
Variable 
Liberalization 
Real Wage 
Change 
Liberalization 
Wage Change 
Relative to 
Pre-
liberalization 
Wages 
Liberalization 
Wage Change 
Relative to 
Control 
Group 
Difference in 
Difference 
Wage 
Change 
Constant     0.1583***     0.1915***     0.2687***     0.2015*** 
  (0.048)   (0.051)   (0.054)   (0.054)  
     
Observations 25 25 25 25 
     
Notes: Panel A shows the following summary statistics for each country. Column 1 shows the log real 
wage change from event year [0] to [3] for each country's liberalization episode. Column 2 presents the 
liberalization real wage change expressed relative to the country's mean log real wage change from [-3] to 
[-1]. Column 3 is the liberalization log real wage change expressed relative to the contemporaneous mean 
log real wage change for the control group countries between years [0] and [3]. Column 4 presents the 
difference-in-difference log real wage change that subtracts the different in the pre-liberalization wage 
change between the treatment and control groups from the quantity in column 3. In Panel B, for columns 
1-4, we test whether the mean differs significantly from zero and report a heteroscedasticity-consistent 
estimate of the standard error in parentheses. (***), (**), (*) represent 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 3. THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION ON REAL WAGE GROWTH IS TEMPORARY AND 
DECLINES OVER TIME. 
 Panel A 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Time 
Window ([-3],[-1]) ([0], [2])  ([0], [3]) ([0], [4]) ([0],[5]) ([0],[6]) 
Liberalize  -0.0237**  0.0341*** 0.0369*** 0.0314***   0.0190*  0.012 
  (0.011)   (0.013)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.011)  (0.011) 
       
Constant 0.0154*** 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 437 437 437 437 437 437 
R-squared 0.139 0.145 0.15 0.147 0.138 0.135 
             
Panel B 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
  Year [0] Year [1] Year [2] Year [3] Year [4] Year [5] 
            
Liberalize 0.0002 0.0476**
*
0.0718**
*
0.0316 -0.0047 -0.0456 
 (0.02) (0.015) (0.021) (0.02) (0.023) (0.032) 
        
Constant 0.0114** 0.0064 0.0078 0.0099* 0.0116**  0.0134***  
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
N 437 437 437 437 437 437 
R-squared 0.132 0.149 0.152 0.136 0.132 0.139 
Notes: Panel A presents coefficient estimates on the liberalization dummy over time or the time profile of 
the impact of liberalization on the growth rate of real wages. Panel A presents estimates of the coefficient 
on the liberalization dummy allowing progressively more periods after the reform (from 2 up to 6) and for 
the pre-liberalization period ([-3],[-1]). The left-hand side variable is the natural log of the real wage 
change. Panel B presents the coefficient estimates on the liberalization dummy by individual year ranging 
from the liberalization year [0] up to five years following the liberalization [5]. N is the number of 
observations. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. (***), (**), (*) represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance, respectively.   
 
 
TABLE 4.  LIBERALIZATION TEMPORARILY INCREASES THE GROWTH RATES OF REAL WAGES & PRODUCTIVITY. 
Dependent Variable 
Real Wage (log-difference 
relative to control group) 
Real Wage (log-difference 
relative to control group) 
Real Wage 
(log-
difference) 
Real Value-Added per 
worker (log-difference 
relative to control group) 
Time Window  ([-3],[+3]) Full Sample ([-3],[+3]) Full Sample Full Sample ([-3],[+3]) ([-3],[+3]) 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)  
Liberalize 0.0314*** 0.0362** 0.0394** 0.0474*** 0.0388** 0.0972*** 0.1026*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.016) 
Trade 0.0051 0.0172 0.0211 0.0197 0.0170 0.0509 0.0694*** 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.045) (0.024) 
Stabilize 0.0228 -0.0303 -0.0288 -0.0289 -0.0278 -0.0577 -0.0622 
 (0.023) (0.02) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.099) (0.067) 
Privatize 0.0285 0.0165 0.0298 0.0100 0.0055 -0.0603 -0.0430 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.019) (0.049) (0.041) 
Brady 0.0405 0.0168 -0.0265** -0.0226 0.0155 -0.0011 -0.0676 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.012) (0.025) (0.023) (0.116) (0.09) 
Constant 0.0104 0.0211*** 0.0196 0.0215*** 0.0180*** -0.0332 -0.0361 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006) (0.09) (0.071) 
Standard Errors 
Clustered  
(Country) 
Clustered  
(Country & Year) Ro bust 
Clustered 
(Year) 
Clustered 
(Country & 
Year) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No 
Observations 152 722 152 722 758 146 146 
R-squared 0.38 0.12 0.092 0.03 0.1730 0.19 0.07 
Notes: The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares. Standard errors appear in parentheses. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
LIBERALIZE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 in the year that country i liberalizes (year [0]) and each of the subsequent three years ([1] [2] and [3]).  TRADE, STABILIZE, PRIVATIZE, 
and BRADY are dummy variables that take on the value 1 whenever a trade liberalization, inflation stabilization, privatization or Brady plan program takes place during country i’s capital account 
liberalization episode. ([-3],[+3]) denotes a time window of three years prior to and following the liberalization year.
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TABLE 5. LIBERALIZATION DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT EMPLOYMENT.
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Liberalize  -0.015 -0.0141 -0.0154 -0.0189 -0.0061 -0.0106 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.02) (0.021) 
Trade  -0.0159    -0.0101 
  (0.083)    (0.089) 
Stabilize   -0.0148   0.0106 
   (0.019)   (0.028) 
Privatize    0.0115  0.0173 
    (0.02)  (0.027) 
Brady     -0.1201 -0.1260 
     (0.079) (0.087) 
Constant -0.0443** -0.0421** -0.0448** -0.0456** -0.0211 -0.0203 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.03) 
       
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.122 0.122 
Notes: The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.  All specifications contain year-specific and country-
specific dummy variables. Standard errors appear in parentheses.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  For the regressions reported, the left-hand-side variable is the 
change in the natural log of employment over the full sample.  LIBERALIZE is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of 1 in the year that country i liberalizes (year [0]) and each of the subsequent three years ([1] [2] and [3]).  
TRADE, STABILIZE, PRIVATIZE, and BRADY are dummy variables that take on the value 1 whenever a trade 
liberalization, inflation stabilization, privatization or Brady Plan program takes place during country i’s capital 
account liberalization episode. 
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APPENDIX A 
Countries that had not liberalized as of 1997: Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia. 
Countries that liberalized before 1980: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway. 
Countries that liberalized between 1980 and 1997: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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